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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST A TE OF UT'AH
LEE C. FELT, a/k/a
LEE CRAIG FELT,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
ROBERT S. FELT,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12409

BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action on an Order to Show Cause why
the Respondent should not be held in contempt for failure to make alimony payments awarded to Appellant
under a Divorce Decree and on Respondent's motion to
modify the Divorce Decree respecting alimony payments.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court on the Order to Show
Cause and Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree. Judgment in favor of Appellant was entered on the
Order to Show Cause and Judgment against Appellant
was entered on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce
1

Decree. From the Judgment against Appellant on Re.
spondent's Motion, Appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment against her
on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree and
reinstatement of the original Divorce Decree.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and Respondent were married at Salt Lake
City, Utah, on the 17th day of September, 1949. On or
about April 19, 1967, Appellant filed in the District Court
of Salt Lake County a Complaint seeking a Decree of
Divorce from Respondent on the grounds of mental cruel·
ty. (AR 1)* In said Complaint Appellant also sought
to be awarded an equitable portion of the assets accumu·
lated by her and Respondent and sought a reasonable sum
as alimony.
Appellant filed a Consent and Waiver on May 17,
1967, whereby she consented that the divorce hearing be
held prior to the expiration of the 90-day waiting period.
(AR 16) A Stipulation and Motion and an Entry of Ap·
pearance, Consent and Waiver were filed on May 17, 1967
for Respondent by and through his attorney, Mr. Grant
C. Aadnesen, whereby Respondent acknowledged receipt
of the Complaint and consented that the 90-day period be
waived if the Court granted Appellant's motion. (AR 17)
The hearing on Appellant's Complaint seeking a Decree
*References are to pages of Abstract of Record
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of Divorce was set for May 17, 1967, before the Honoraable D. Frank Wilkins, District Judge of the Third Judicial District.
Prior to the date set for hearing of Appellant's Complaint, the parties, by and through their respective counsel, negotiated and entered into a detailed Property Settlement Agreement on May 16, 1967. (AR 4) Said Agreement was 13 typewritten pages in length and indicated
that the Appellant and Respondent had carefully considered its provisions as all assets of the parties were listed and
divided Article II of the Agreement made provision for
an alimony settlement. (AR 11) It was agreed that Respondent would pay to Appellant the sum of $1,000 per
month, payable on or before the first day of each month,
commencing June 1, 1967. Respondent's obligation to pay
was to cease upon his death or upon Appellant's death
or remarriage.
It was further agreed in the Property Settlement

Agreement that the alimony to be paid Appellant by Respondent was reasonable in view of the efforts made by
Appellant in assisting Respondent in his professional education and in view of Appelant's present circumstances
and social standing. The likelihood that Appellant would
work and that her income would increase following the
entry of the decree was expressly contemplated in the
Agreement by both Appellant and Respondent and their
counsel. The Agreement expressly provided in language
not controverted that the alimony payments were not to
be adjusted in the event of an increase in Appellant's income. Also, the Agreement provided that the alimony
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payments were not to be adjusted notwithstanding increases or decreases in Respondent's income, unless sub.
stantial changes occurred such that Respondent was reasonably unable to pay the agreed alimony.
The hearing on Appellant's Complaint was held on
May 17, 1967. Respondent did not appear at said hearing,
he having previously filed an Entry of Appearance, Consent and Waiver. Appellant testified that she was familiar
with the Property Settlement Agreement which had been
filed with the Court and that she had read it, consulted
counsel and signed the same. (AR 24) She declared her
satisfaction with the division of assets and the alimony
provisions. The Court inquired about the net worth of
the parties after the Property Settlement Agreement and
what each party would receive as a result of said Agreement. It was stated by Appellant's counsel that each
party would receive between $10,000.00 and $15,000.00.
(AR 25) The Court was aware of the alimony provisions
of the Agreement and questioned Appellant and her coun·
sel about the earnings of Respondent and whether there
was a cut-off date on the alimony. (AR 25) The Court
wisely inquired into the substance of what is the essence
of this appeal, and relating to the Appellant's employ·
ment plans, the following exchange took place (AR 25):
"THE COURT: Do you work now, Mrs.
Felt, or do you intend to?
THE WITNESS: I work part time. I do
radio and TV commercials part time, and I hope
to work again.
THE COURT: That wouldn't surprise me.
4

THE WITNESS: Oh, well, you are very kind.
THE COURT: So you can supplement your
income, this one thousand, to some extent?
THE WITNESS: Yes."
A Decree of Divorce was granted to Appellant on
May 17, 1967, according to the terms of her Complaint,
except where modified by the Property Settlement Agreement. (AR 19) Appellant was awarded certain properties and the sum of $1,000 per month alimony, as provided in the terms of said Agreement, which was fully
incorporated in the Decree of Divorce and declared to
be fair and reasonable.
Respondent made the alimony payments required by
the Divorce Decree during 1967 and 1968, but became
delinquent in 1969. On October 7, 1969, Appellant filed
a Petition For Order to Show Cause (AR 26) why Respondent should not be held in contempt of Court which
resulted in a Judgment against Respondent in the amount
of $4,600, entered December 9, 1969. (AR 35) On November 14, 1969, Respondent filed a Motion to Amend
Divorce Decree (AR 29) accompanied by his affidavit
filed November 19, 1969 (AR 30), which alleged the
following grounds in support of modification:
( 1) He was prevailed upon by Appellant
and counsel, both his and Appellant's, to consent
to an alimony provision which was unreasonable
and unfair,
(2) He had remarried since the divorce.
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(3) The work load he had to maintain to
meet the alimony payments was professionally in.
advisable.
(4) His income had remained approximately
the same but his professional and living costs had
drastically increased.
( 5) He had substantial indebtedness which
he had not been able to reduce since the divorce
because of the alimony payments.
(6) The Appellant had obtained full time
employment whereas she was employed only part
time at the time of the divorce.
(7) Appellant had substantial stock and investment plus properties received under the Divorce Decree.
(8) Appellant was in good health, employed
and should not be dependent on him for her livelihood. She was well educated and qualified to
earn a living.
Appellant filed a Reply to Defendant's Affidavit
on November 21, 1969 (AR 32), whereby she opposed
Respondent's Affidavit and Motion to Amend Divorce
Decree. She contended that the Divorce Decree was entered in contemplation of the likelihood of her future
employment and with knowledge of her education and
training. Furthermore, Appellant argued that the Prop·
erty Settlement Agreement which was incorporated in
the decree provided that the alimony was not to be ad·
justed regardless of her income. Appellant denied that
Respondent had been prevailed upon to sign the Prop·
erty Settlement Agreement and generally denied the other
allegations of Respondent. Various documents were
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thereafter filed by both Appellant and Respondent m
support of their respective positions.
Respondent again neglected to meet his obligation
pay alimony and was found to be in contempt of
Court by a Judgment entered August 18, 1970 in the
amount of $8,000. (AR 38) Thereafter, by Order of
the Court filed August 18, 1970 (AR 38), hearing was
set for October 1, 1970 on an Order to Show Cause why
Respondent should not be held in contempt for failure
to pay alimony and hearing was set for the same date
on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree.

to

Following the hearing held October 1, 1970, the
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court, issued a Memorandum Decision on November 5, 1970 (AR 60), finding Respondent in contempt of Court and modifying the alimony provision of
the Divorce Decree by reducing it to $1.00 per year.
On December 3, 1970, Appellant, through her attorney,
filed a Motion For a New Trial and To Amend Memorandum Decision. (AR 63) Hearing was held on Appellant's Motion January 18, 1971 and an Order Denying
Motion for New Trial was entered on February 2, 1971.
(AR 67) Also on February 2, 1971, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall entered an Order Modifying Divorce Decree
and Respecting Contempt (AR 67) and filed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (AR 69) Appellant
filed Notice of Appeal the 16th day of February, 1971.
(AR 74) The content and grounds for the foregoing
motions, orders and decisions will be discussed hereinafter.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY RE-EXAMINING THE
BASES OF THE DIVORCE COURT'S AWARD
OF ALIMONY AND BY MODIFYING SAID
AWARD.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO
GIVE THE ALIMONY AWARD OF A DJ.
VORCE DECREE THE FINAL STATUS AC
CORDED TO ANY CIVIL JUDGMENT
AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MOD.
IFY THE DECREE ONLY WHERE THERE
HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL OR PERMANENT CHANGE IN THE MATERIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES
SINCE THE DIVORCE DECREE.

The rules governing modification of the alimony
portion of a Divorce Decree grant the Trial Court some
discretion but do not permit re-examination of the evi·
dence and modification at will. This Court recognized
the foregoing principle in the case of Sorensen v. Soren,
sen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d 180 (1968), where it
stated at page 181:
"Generally, the court is required to give such a
decree the final status accorded to any civil judg·
ment and to apply the doctrine of res judicata
thereto. The parties should be entitled to rely
on the finality of the alimony award in deter·
mining the right to receive and the duty to pay."
Although modification is permitted, as long as the de·
cree stands, the husband must comply with it or make
8

every reasonable effort to do so, regardless of how the
financial situation of his former wife may have improved. Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233
(1948).

With respect to the modification of divorce decrees,
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5 (Supp. 1969), provides:
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and
children, as may be equitable. The court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to
the support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support and
maintenance, or the distribution of the property
as sh:ill be reasonable and necessary."
This statute has been construed to empower the Courts
to modify an alimony award where there has been a
substantial or permanent change in the material circumstances of either one or both of the parties since the
decree was entered. Sorensen v. Sorensen, supra; Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1963);
Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894 (1935). As
more fully discussed hereinafter, however, the Courts
may not consider events specifically contemplated by the
Divorce Court and which served as the bases for the
Divorce Decree and Property Settlement Agreement in
determining whether there has been a change of circumstances. The party seeking modification must allege
and prove a material and permanent change of conditions
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since entry of the decree which would require under the
rules of equity and justice, a change in the decree. Hen.
ricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277 (1936)j
Carson v. Carson, supra; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65
Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925).
Where a party is dissatisfied with a divorce decree
or feels the alimony award is excessive, his remedy in
the absence of a permanent and material change in circumstances is to prosecute a timely appeal. Otherwise,
the decree cannot be modified. In commenting upon the
procedures available to accomplish modification of a
divorce decree, this Court observed in Cody v. Cody, 47
Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916) at page 955:
"We do not think the Legislature intended that
the courts should review the allowances made by
them for alimony in divorce proceedings, but what
was intended was that, where material new con·
ditions have arisen after the decrees were made,
which conditions were not, and could not have
been, considered or passed on by the courts, then,
upon proper application and proof, the courts
may make 'subsequent changes or new orders'
respecting the allowance of alimony or the dis·
tribution of property or the disposal of children.
Where a party is dissatisfied with the original al·
lowance or distribution of property, or the dis·
posal of the children, he must prosecute a timely
appeal to review the court's orders or decrees in
that regard, and in such cases the review must
be had upon the evidence adduced upon the orig·
inal hearing. When the conditions have changed,
however, as before stated, the changes or new
orders must be based upon the allegations of the
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changed conditions and the evidence in support
thereof."
The principles espoused in the Cody case were subsequently reaffirmed by this Court in Anderson v. Anderson, supra. Thus, unless the Trial Court's modification
of the alimony award is founded upon a material and
permanent change in the circumstances of the parties
which has occurred since the entry of the Divorce Decree, the Trial Court exceeded its authority in modifying
the alimony award.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S MODIFICATION
OF THE ALIMONY AWARD IS FOUNDED UPON A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
EVIDENCE UNDERLYING THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE AND A DETERMINATION THAT SAID DIVORCE DECREE WAS UNFAIR AND UNREASONABLE.

At the hearing on Appellant's Complaint seeking a
decree of divorce, the Court inquired into the pertinent
circumstances of the Appellant and Respondent before
granting the divorce. Appellant testified concerning her
employment during the period of marriage and specifically during the time Respondent was completing his
medical training. (AR 24) The Property Settlement
Agreement which has previously been executed by the
parties was before the Court and Appellant commented
that she was satisfied with the division of assets and
the alimony provisions. (AR 25) The Court inquired
in the amount of assets each party would receive pursuant to the Agreement and asked whether there was a
11

cut-off date on the alimony provision. It was explained
to the Court by Appellant's counsel that the alimony
payments would terminate in the event of Appellant's
death or remarriage, or if Respondent was unable be.
cause of a change in circumstances to earn the amount
of money he was then earning, the alimony payments
could be reduced. (AR 25) In response to further ques·
tions by the Court, Appellant and her counsel stated that
Respondent's gross income was in excess of $60,000 per
year. (AR 25)
Following the hearing on Appellant's Complaint, the
Court awarded Appellant a Decree of Divorce on May 17,
1967, which incorporated therein and adopted the Prop·
erty Settlement Agreement as being fair and reasonable.
Said Agreement was incorporated by the Court in its
decree with full knowledge of the asset division, em·
ployment history and prospects of Appellant, alimony
payment provisions and earning capacity of Respondent.
On or about November 14, 1969, Respondent filed
a Motion to Amend Divorce Decree, accompanied by his
affidavit setting forth eight grounds for modification.
(AR 29) Although seven of the reasons set forth, which
will be discussed hereinafter, may arguably be classi·
fied as alleging changed circumstances, the first reason
calls for a re-examination of the original decree. Re·
spondent alleged that at the time of the divorce, he was
prevailed upon by Appellant, her counsel and his counsel
to consent to an alimony award that was unreasonable
and unfair at the time. (AR 30)
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At the trial held on Respondent's Motion to Amend
Divorce Decree, it is evident that the Court permitted
the premises and fairness of the Divorce Decree itself
to be examined. Respondent's counsel declared in his
opening statement that he did not intend the Court to
be confined to the matter of whether there had been a
change of circumstances on the part of either party, but
intended to show that the decree itself prescribed an unreasonable burden on the Respondent and was basically unfair and founded upon erroneous premises that
should be examined. (AR 40) Appellant's counsel objected to any attempt to broaden the proceeding into
an inquiry into the basic fairness of the decree, however,
the Court indicated it did not intend to unnecessarily restrict Respondent. (AR 40) The Court admitted having
some reservations about whether the scope of the hearing could be as broad as Respondent's counsel argued
since there was a Property Settlement Agreement signed
by the parties which had been adopted and approved
by the Divorce Court. (AR 40) Nevertheless, the Court
permitted Respondent's counsel to proceed as he had
indicated.
Appellant was examined by Respondent's counsel,
Mr. Hunt, and over objection of Mr. Burton, Appellant's
counsel, Mr. Hunt questioned Appellant at length concerning her present earnings, living expenses, health and
education. (AR 41) Appellant was also asked about her
employment at the time of the divorce. (AR 42) On redirect examination by Mr. Hunt, Appellant further testified concerning her employment during her marriage
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to Respondent. (AR 46) The Trial Court in permitting
inquiry into Appellant's employment history prior to
divorce, education, earnings and health, abused its dis.
cretion since these factors were before the Divorce Court
and taken into account in entering the Divorce Decree.
Mr. Hunt next examined the Respondent and asked
why he signed the Property Settlement Agreement which
provided that the alimony payments were being made
"in view of the efforts made by plaintiff in assisting defendant in his professional education." (AR 47) Mr.
Burton objected on the grounds that the inquiry was
entering the area of impeaching the Divorce Decree.
(AR 47) In overruling Mr. Burton's objection, the Court
again indicated its intention to be flexible as to the scope
of questioning and admitted Mr. Burton's position may
be correct. (AR 47) Respondent then testified as to the
reasons why he signed the Agreement.
On cross-examination Respondent was questioned
by Mr. Burton in regards to his allegation that he was
prevailed upon by Appellant, her counsel and his coun·
sel to sign the Property Settlement Agreement. Re·
spondent admitted that he had discussed the terms of the
Agreement with his counsel and specifically the alimony
provision, and following said discussions had signed the
same. (AR 51-54) He further declared that he had never
discussed said Agreement directly with Appellant or her
counsel and did not know what was meant by the state·
ment in his affidavit that he was prevailed upon by ap·
pellant and her course! to sign the Agreement. (AR 54-55)
14

Again, during cross-examination of the Appellant
by Mr. Hunt, questions were directed to Appellant's employment and earnings in the initial years of marriage.
She was also questioned concerning the sources of Appellant's and Respondent's support following his graduation from medical school. (AR 58) Further inquiry
was made into the issue of who furnished the costs of
Respondent's medical schooling. (AR 58)
At the conclusion of the testimony, Mr. Hunt reiterated Respondent's position in his closing argument that
the Divorce Decree was unfair, that the Property Settlement Agreement should be re-examined, and the alimony reduced. (AR 60) Although Mr. Hunt included
allegations that there had been a change of circumstances,
the thrust of his argument was that the decree was unfair and almost a fraud upon the Court. (AR 60)
On November 5, 1970, the Trial Court entered its
original Memorandum Decision in which Respondent
was found in contempt of Court and the alimony award
of the Divorce Decree was reduced from $1,000 per
month to $1.00 per year. (AR 60) To support its modification of the alimony award, the Trial Court concluded that the Appellant was well qualified from an
educational and experience standpoint in her chosen field
of endeavor to adequately maintain herself, particularly
in view of the fact that Appellant had changed from
part-time to full time employment since the divorce.
The Court stated further that the Property Settlement
Agreement and the alimony award were based in part

15

on a recognition of Appellant's efforts to assist Respond.
ent in obtaining his medical education and found her
efforts to be substantial in this regard. The Memoran.
dum Decision then stated:
"4. That the plaintiff is reasonably entitled
to alimony for a given period of time sufficient
to permit her to properly adjust to single life;
however, to allow permanent alimony in the
amount provided for in the Decree is unjust, unnecesary, and not equitable and the Decree is
consequently modified to provide for the payment
of said amounts of alimony through the month of
May, 1971, a period of four years in all, said
payments to cease thereafter, except for the pay·
ment of the nominal sum of $1.00 per year neces·
sary to preserve the right of plaintiff to future
assistance should a true need arise." (AR 62)
Noticeably absent from the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision is any finding that there had been a permanent or substantial change in the material circum·
stances of the parties since entry of the Divorce Decree.
Instead, the decision speaks in terms of the Decree being
unjust and inequitable. The factors relief upon by the
Court to substantiate its modification were considered
by the parties prior to signing the Property Settlement
Agreement and were before the Divorce Court. The
reasons set forth by the Court do not justify a modification of the alimony award.
Appellant filed a Motion For A New Trial And To
Amend Memorandum Decision on December 3, 1970.
The main reason asserted in support of Appellant's mo·
tion was that the reporter's notes of the divorce hearing
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had recently been found and transcribed and that such
transcript would clarify which factors had been considered by the Court in entering its Divorce Decree. (AR 63)
At the hearing held on Appellant's motion, January 18,
1971, the deficiencies discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph were brought to the attention of the
Trial Court. The Court commented that in modifying
the alimony award it did not intend to imply that the
decision rendered by the Divorce Court was unjust or
inequitable. (AR 66) It stated that by reason of a change
in circumstances the decree had become unjust and unreasonable. Appellant's motion was denied on February
2, 1971, and the Trial Court entered an Order Modifying
Divorce Decree and Respecting Contempt the same date
and adopted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
In upholding its prior decision which modified the
alimony award, the Court adopted Findings of Fact in
an attempt to correct the deficiencies existing in its original Memorandum Decision. The facts therein stated,
however, along with the statements by the Court that
it did not intend to imply that the Divorce Decree was
unjust or inequitable, fail to justify modification of the
decree and do not disguise the fact that the Court undertook a re-examination of the basis of the original Divorce Decree. Said Findings state that Appellant is well
qualified to adequately maintain herself, that Appellant
is now employed full time, that Appellant is in good
health, that the alimony award was based in part on
recognition of Appellant's efforts, which were substantial, in assisting Respondent in his medical education.
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(AR 69) All of these factors were properly before the
Court in the divorce hearing and considered by the
parties in drafting the Property Settlement Agreement.
The Court has, in effect, reviewed the basis of the orig.
inal Divorce Decree and adopted Findings of Fact to
support a contrary decision on the alimony issue.
The Findings of Fact alter paragraph 4 of the orig.
inal Memorandum Decision by adding the italicized portion as follows:
"8. That the plaintiff was reasonably entitled to alimony for a given period of time sufficient to permit her to properly adjust to single
life; as to the award and amount thereof at the
time of the divorce decree, this court makes no
finding; however, to continue to allow permanalimony in the amount provided for in the Decree
in light of the present situation and circumstances
of parties is unjust, unnecessary, and not equitable .... " (AR 71)
Thus, by the addition of a few words, the Court seeks
to correct the deficiencies inherent in its original Mem·
orandum Decision.
Said Findings of Fact further state that Appellant's
income from employment and investments is suitable to
maintain her and is higher than at the time of divorce,
that Respondent has remarried since the divorce, that
Respondent's income has increased but not commensu·
rate with his cost of doing business and that substantial
changes in the circumstances and situations of the parties
hereto have occurred since the date of the Divorce De·
cree. (AR 71-72) Again, the matters of Appellant's in·
18

come and Respondent's income were properly considered by the Court at the divorce hearing and by the
parties themselves in entering into the Property Settlement Agreement. The Findings also noticeably neglect
to specify what substantial changes in the circumstances
and situations of the parties have occurred.
It is evident from the foregoing that at the hearing

on Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce Decree, the
Court re-examined the factual basis underlying the original Divorce Decree and determined that the alimony
award of the Decree was unfair and inequitable. The
statements of Respondent's counsel plus the testimony
adduced at the hearing on the motion to amend, clearly
indicate that there was an inquiry into the basic fairness
of the Divorce Decree. The original Memorandum Decision of the Court was premised upon factors which were
properly contemplated by the Court at the divorce hearing and considered by the parties in establishing the
Property Settlement Agreement. Said decision made no
reference to permanent or substantial changes in the material circumstances of the parties as is required before
modification of an alimony award can be ordered, but
was phrased in terms of an unjust, unnecessary and inequitable alimony award.
The statements by the Court at the hearing on Appellant's motion for a new trial to the effect that it
did not intend to imply that the original Divorce Decree
was inequitable do not correct the error. The issues
examined and the testimony presented at the modifica-
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tion hearing plainly indicate an examination into those
factors relied upon by the Court at the divorce hearing
in entering its decree. Neither do the Findings of Fact
adopted by the Court disguise the fact that the Court
exceeded its authority in re-examining the premises un.
derlying the Divorce Decree. The facts set forth in the
Court's findings show that its modification of the aJi.
mony award was not based upon a substantial change
in the material circumstances of the parties.
As was pointed out in the Cody case, supra, where
a party is dissatisfied with the alimony award, he must
prosecute a timely appeal to review the Court's order
and in such cases a review may be had upon the evi·
dence adduced at the original hearing. At the hearing
on Respondent's motion to modify the Divorce Decree,
the Court acted in the capacity of an Appellate Court
in reviewing the Divorce Court's decree and thus ex·
ceeded its proper authority. Appellant urges that this
Court find that the Trial Court failed to apply the doc·
trine of res judicata to the Divorce Decree but instead
abused its authority by re-examining the basis of the
Divorce Decree and modifying the alimony award absent
a finding that there had been a permanent or substantial
change in the material circumstances of the parties.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION,
EARNING CAP A CITY AND HEALTH, PLUS
RESPONDENT'S REMARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO JUSTIFY MODIFICATION OF A DIVORCE DECREE.
A.

EVENTS SPECIFICALLY CONTEMPLATED
BY THE PARTIES AND THE DIVORCE
COURT AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE
AND WHICH SERVED AS THE BASES
FOR THE DIVORCE AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES UPON THEIR SUBSEQUENT OCCURRENCE.

The general rule regarding changes contemplated
when the Divorce Decree was entered is stated in Annotation, 18A.L.R.2d10, 21 (1951):
"Where the alleged change in the circumstances
of the parties is one that the trial court expected
and probably made allowances for when entering
the original decree, the change is not a ground for
a modification of the decree."
Thus, where it was contemplated by the Court at the
divorce hearing that Appellant would obtain employment
and the parties agreed in the Property Settlement Agreement that an increase in Appellant's income would not
be reason for reducing the alimony payments, Appellant's
full time employment is not a ground for modification
of the decree.
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The foregoing principle was applied by this Coun
10 the early case of Cody v. Cody, supra. In construing
the forerunner to Section 30-3-5 of the present Utah Codi
Annotated which authorizes subsequent changes in a de.
cree granting alimony, the Court stated:
"We do not think the Legislature intended that
the courts should review the allowances made hr
them for alimony in divorce proceedings, but wh;1
was intended was that, where material new con.
Jitions have arisen after the decrees were made,
which conditions were not, and could not hai•e
been, considered or passed on by the courts, then,
upon proper application and proof, the courts may
m<lke 'subsequent changes or new orders' respect·
ing the allowance of alimony or the distribution of
property or the disposal of children." (emphasis
added)
Applying the rationale of Cody to the instant case, the
Trial Court did not have the authority to modify the ali·
mony award on the basis of conditions which were con·
sidered and passed on by the Court at the divorce hearing.
In the case of Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475
P.2d 1021 (1970), this Court again applied the rule gov·
erning modification in the light of the occurrence of
events contemplated by the Divorce Court. The plaintiff
in Allen was granted a decree of divorce and awarded ali·
mony of $200 per month. At the date of the granting of
divorce, plaintiff was not employed but contemplated
securing employment within six months. The divorce
hearinL':
a was conducted as a default matter but the defend·
ant w:is present and in effect stipulated to the terms of
the settlement as decreed by the Court. Shortly following
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the divorce hearing, plaintiff secured employment and at
the time the petition for modification of the decree was
heard she was earning approximately $210 per month,
net. The defendant's petition for modification was predicated upon a substantial change in the material circumstances of either one or both of the parties since the entry
of the decree. In commencing upon defendant's contentions, the Court stated at page 1022:
"He bases his contention on several facts, one of
which is that the plaintiff has permanent employment, and he seeks a discontinuance of the alimony
allowance of $200 per month. However, the decree
of divorce, when granted, contemplated that the
plaintiff would secure employment and contribuate
to her own support. The defendant further contends that since the former residence of the parties
was sold, and the proceeds divided, this fact constitutes a material change in the plaintiff's financial
circumstances. However, here again, there is a
development that was contemplated at the time
of the trial court's decree." (emphasis added)
Subsequent to the Allen case, this Court rendered its
Utah 2d
, 481, P.2d
decision in Short v. Short,
54 (1971). In that case, Mrs. Short, who was unemployed
at the time, was granted a divorce and awarded $75 per
month for alimony and a like amount for child support.
Mrs. Short, who had been employed in the past, obtained
employment after the decree and Mr. Short filed a petition to eliminate the alimony on the ground of changed
circumstances. Relief was denied Mr. Short by the Trial
Court on three different occasions and he appealed. In
upholding the Trial Court's dismissal of Mr. Short's petition, this Court observed at page 5 5:
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"It appears obvious to us that the award in the
decree was consistent with and based upon the as.
sumption that Mrs. S. again would be able to ob.
tain employment, - otherwise the trial court',
socio-economic philosophy would have been super.
ficially inane.

In the instant case, we must and do assume that
the court did not intend that the $75 alimon1
award would be eliminated if Mrs. S. obtained a
job paying $75 per month, - or even $175 per
month, - or even $389 per month, the income of
Mrs. S. at her job at time of the third petition to
eliminate the alimony."
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the
Cody) Allen and Short cases, where the alleged change in
circumstances is one that the Trial Court contemplated
and probably made allowance for when entering its
divorce decree, the subsequent change is not a ground for
modification of the decree. This is especially true in the
case of a wife's contemplated employment following the
decree.
The Trial Court at the divorce hearing was fully
aware of Appellant's employment history and her inten·
tion to obtain full time employment after the divorce.
As more fully set forth in the Statement of Facts herein,
the Court specifically asked the Appellant if she worked
or intended to, and she replied that she worked part time
and hoped to work again. (AR 25) The Property Settle·
ment Agreement was also before the Court in which the
parties had agreed that changes in Appellant's income
would not be grounds for reducing the alimony payment
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prov1s1on. The Divorce Decree was entered by the Court
with full knowledge of Appellant's intention to seek full
time employment. Therefore, as a matter of law, Appellant's return to full time employment and the ensuing
increase in her income is not a change of circumstances.
Thus, paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12 of the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact (AR 70-72) adopted after the hearing on
modification do not constitute changed circumstances upon
which modification of an alimony award can be based.
The Cody, Allen and Short decisions are based upon
excellent reasoning, sound logic and fairness to the parties.
Where the parties in a divorce action and their counsel
all contemplate that a wife may become employed or her
income may be augmented by additional working effort
after the decree has been entered, and the trial judge considers such circumstances and bases his decree thereon,
there is strong reason for giving effect to the agreement
and understanding of the parties, as approved by the trial
judge. It is manifestly unfair, where the wife in reliance
upon such agreement and the Trial Court's decision with
respect thereto, seeks additional employment upon the
understanding that it will not affect her alimony or property settlement arrangements, only to find out later that
another judge can re-evaluate the circumstances and enter
a new order dictating the exactly opposite effect of the
decree of the trial judge. If Cody, Allen and Short were
not correct decisions, the divorced wife in these circumstances, who avoids work and efforts to contribute to her
own support, may be better off economically than the
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wife who in reliance upon the Trial Court's decision at.
tempts to improve her lot in life by seeking self-em.
ployment.

B.

RESPONDENT'S VOLUNTARY ACT OF
REJ\fARRIAGE SHOULD NOT BE CON.
SIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER
THERE HAS BEEN A PERMANENT AND
M A T E RI A L CHANGE OF CIRCUM.
STANCES.

The law is clear that the remarriage of a party foJ.
lowing a divorce and the assumption by him of the obliga·
tion to support a new wife and child is not a basis for
modification of an alimony award. In Sorensen v. Soren·
sen, supra, the defendant alleged six grounds for modifica·
tion of the alimony decree, one of which was his remar·
riagt: and assumption of the obligation to support a wife
and to assist her in caring for her handicapped child. The
Trial Court reduced the alimony from $1,250 per month
to $1,000 per month. This Court reinstated the original
alimony award on appeal and stated that defendant's act
of remarriage "involved voluntary action on the part of
the defendant and, under the circumstances, [was] not
available to him in justification for reducing the alimony."
Application of the Sorensen case necessitates the conclu·
sion that paragraph 10 of the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact does not constitute a change of circumstances upon
which modification of an alimony award can be predicated.
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
TRIAL C 0 UR T ' S CONCLUSION THAT
THERE HAS BEEN A PERMANENT AND
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
SUFFICIENT TOW ARRANT A REDUCTION
IN ALIMONY.
Eliminating paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 from the
Trial Court's Findings as not stating sufficient changed
circumstances for the reasons previously discussed, leaves
only paragraphs 11 and 14 plus portions of the foregoing
paragraphs which allege an increase in Appellant's income from investments as possible bases for the Court's
modification of the alimony award. It is asserted in part
of paragraph 12 that Appellant's income from investments
is substantially higher than at the time of the Divorce
Decree, however, there is no finding as to the amount of
the alleged increase in investment income. In fact, the
only evidence before the Court as to the amount of AppelIant' s income from investments was her uncontroverted
testimony that her income from stocks and bonds amounted to $100.00 per year or less. (AR 42)
Paragraph 14 of said Findings merely states: "Substantial changes in the circumstances and situations of
parties hereto have occurred since the date of the Divorce
Decree." There is no indication whatsoever as to what
changes in circumstances the Court is referring to in the
foregoing finding. If said changes are those alleged in
the preceding paragraphs of the Findings, paragraph 14
adds nothing, since the preceding paragraphs fail to re-
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cite any amounts, facts or other evidence to substantiatt
the conclusions that there have been changes in Appel.
lam's income, education or health since the decree. u
said paragraph 14 was intended to refer to other changes
the Court has failed to so specify. Thus paragraph 14 o/
the Findings is not a proper basis for the Trial Court\
modification of the alimony award.
Paragraph 11 of the Findings declares:
"Since the Divorce Decree herein, defendant's
costs of doing business has substantially increased:
his income has increased but not commensuratt
with the increase in cost of doing business." (AR

72)

Once again, the Trial Court has failed to specify the par·
ticular changes in circumstances it relied upon to supporr
modification of the alimony award. No amounts are ser
forth and no other evidence is referred to which indicatei
that the Respondent's cost of doing business has substan·
tially increased. Appellant contends that even viewing
the evidence most favorably for Respondent, said para·
graph 11 does not state a change of circumstance sufficient
to permit a reduction in alimony from $1,000 per month
to $1.00 per year. Respondent's Exhibit 14-D admitted as
evidence at the trial shows that the business expenses oi
his medical practice were $38,973.00 in 1967, $38,490.00
in 1968, and $43,213.00 in 1969, an increase of $4,240.00,
or approximately 10 to 12 percent. Appellant contends
that this increase is not a substantial change and is not
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a sufficient basis for reducing or in fact completely eliminating the original alimony award.
It is evident from the foregoing that the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact are not findings but merely conclusions.
The failure to make proper fin dings further illustrates
that the Trial Court's decision to modify the alimony
award is not based upon evidence presented at trial but
upon the conclusion that the alimony award of the original
Divorce Decree was unreasonable and inequitable. Appellant submits that the evidence does not support the
Trial Court's alleged Findings and therefore does not
support its conclusions and decision to modify.
CONCLUSION
Upon a petition for modification of the alimony
award of a divorce decree, the Court may modify the alimony award only where there has been a substantial or
permanent change in the material circumstances of the
parties since the divorce decree. The Court may not reexamine the basis for the divorce decree and modify the
alimony award upon a finding that said alimony was unreasonable or inequitable when awarded. The Memorandum Decision of the Trial Court, the Findings of Fact
and the testimony adduced at the hearing on Respondent's
Motion to Amend Divorce Decree all indicate that the
Trial Court's reduction of the alimony award was premised on the conclusion that the original alimony award was
unfair and unreasonable.
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In determining whether there has been a substantial
change in the material circumstances of the parties since
entry of the divorce decree, the courts may not rely upon
changes in circumstances, which were expected, contem.
plated or considered by the Divorce Court when entering
its decree. Such changes, as a matter of law, are not
grounds for the modification of an alimony award. Since
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact which relate to Appel.
lant's employment, earning capacity and education involve
matters which were contemplated by the Divorce Court.
Respondent has failed to sustain his burden of proof that
there has been a substantial change in the material circum.
stances of the parties. The Trial Court therefore commit·
ted error in granting Respondent's Motion to Amend Di·
vorce Decree.
On the basis of the foregoing argument, Appellant
respectfully prays that this Court reverse the Trial Court's
action in granting Respondent's Motion to Amend Divorce
Decree and reinstate the alimony provisions of the original
Divorce Decree:
1.

By determining that the Trial Court modified
The Divorce Decree upon a finding that the
original Decree was inequitable and thus ex·
ceeded its authority.

2.

By determining that there has been no s~b·
stantial or permanent change in the material
circumstances of the parties since entry of the
Divorce Decree.
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3.

By awarding to Appellant her costs incurred
herein together with a reasonable attorney's
fee.
Respectfully submitted,
Clifford L. Ashton
Richard H. Stahle
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy
Suite 300, 141 East 1st South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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